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ERPs  offer  a  two-fold  answer  to  the  need  for  integration.  The  first  is  technical  in 
nature,  since  the  architecture  of  these  programs  is  designed  to  ensure  the 
compatibility of their software components and the transparency of their data. They 
also offer a dynamic approach, because ERPs are mechanisms for incorporating a 
company's specific functional elements. However, the ERP solution cannot replace 
every existing management computing system. Accordingly, applying ERP to existing 
systems will have a significant cost, whether it occurs in the implementation of ERP 
itself or in the work of making over the firm's own information system. 
The field surveys that have been carried out show that good management practices 
already included in non-ERP computing systems can easily be transposed into ERP 
systems.  Conversely,  applications  that  do  not  follow  a  horizontal  management 
structure create incompatibilities if we attempt to transfer them into an ERP. 
The influence of the firm's structure on the implementation of ERP will depend on how 
compatible  it  is  with  the  underlying  structure  of  the  ERP  (structure  must  follow 
strategy: A. Chandler.) 
 
 





The impact of worldwide digitization is forcing companies to step up their service-marketing 
activities and to install ERP systems, which raise problems concerning both their purpose 
and their scope.  
 
The  installation  of  Enterprise  Resource  Planning  (ERP)  software  products  is  sometimes 
described  as  an  implantation  (introduction),  and  sometimes  as  an  implémentation 
(implementation). In an attempt to find our bearings, we refer to the dictionary
1: 
“Implémenter comes from the English 'to implement‟, meaning to execute or carry out. In 
computing we say that we install (a particular program) on a computer, to implement a new 
operating system." 
“Implanter means to introduce something into a new environment, and cause it to develop in 
a sustainable manner.” 
 
Thus because we can assume that any firm that is likely to use ERP will already have a 
computer system, it is more reasonable to speak of implementation. Nevertheless, we will 
see that there is still room for debate, since the total re-engineering of information-processing 
systems and the restructuring of the firm could be seen as a starting-over from zero. 
 
In the course of the 20
th century, many generations of computer-based management systems 
have followed one another in quick succession, limiting the possibilities for variation, and 
forcing firms to make technological leaps. Companies thus find themselves at the dawn of 
the  21
st  century  with  limited options, facing  the  same  need  to  integrate  their  information 
systems and the same difficulties in finding a solution. 
 
ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) is a software package that centralizes a company's 
data, its management functions, and its customer-oriented activities. It holds out the promise 
                                                 
1 Le Petit Robert of correcting the structural defects of company information systems and of answering the 
emerging needs of e-commerce 
 
ERP offers a two-fold response to the need for integration. The first is technical in nature, 
since the  architecture  of  these programs  is designed  to ensure  the  compatibility  of their 
software components and the transparency of their data. The second is dynamic, because 
ERPs are mechanisms for incorporating a company's specific functional elements. However, 
the ERP solution cannot replace every existing management computing system,  and this 
poses a problem. Applying ERP to existing systems will therefore have a significant cost, 
whether in the implementation of ERP itself or in the work of making over the firm's own 
information system. 
 
The field surveys that have been carried out show that good management practices already 
included in non-ERP computing systems [J. Akoka and I. Comyn-Wattiau, 2002] can easily 
be transposed into an ERP [Meignan 2002]. Conversely, applications that do not follow a 
horizontal management structure create incompatibilities if we attempt to transfer them into 
an ERP. 
 
The  influence  of  the  firm's  structure  on  the  implementation  of  ERP  will  depend  on  how 
compatible it is with the underlying structure of the ERP. 
Particular attention is focused on the effects of this integration on the purchasing function of 
the company in question. 
 
1. The company's pre-ERP structure 
Raising the question of the effect of company structure on the implementation of an ERP 
requires  that  we  consider  the  types  of  company  that  ought  to  switch  to  this  method  of 
integrating their information systems. 
1.1 The problem of managing innovation 
Our  society  has  actually  seen  few  new  inventions  over  the  last  fifty  years,  outside  of 
computing itself and what the computer has made possible in other fields of technology, 
whether  directly  (calculating  and  modeling),  indirectly  (computer-based  management),  or 
collaterally by technologic spin-offs (digital electronics). New products that are non-digital are 
most often not really innovative either. They tend rather to represent the use of technologies 
that  were  poorly  understood
2,  too  complex  to manufacture,
3  or  too  expensive
4  for  the 
application of mass production. 
 
It is not easy to compile a list of several dozen truly innovative major products that have 
appeared over the last fifty  years. If we eliminate all the ones that are directly related to 
advances in the electronic processing of data, to computing
5, and to the technologies that it 
has financed
6, not many are left. And most of these
7 have an affordable price, compatible 
with mass selling, only because of the embedded computers that now replace more costly 
mechanical equipment. 
                                                 
2  On March 29, 1955, a modified Jeumont-Schneider BB9004 electric locomotive broke the world 
speed record with 331 km/hr. This record would not be broken in France until 1981, by a modified 
TGV (380 km/hr). 
3 High-power lamps for video projectors. 
4 Carbon in brakes and sailboards. 
5 All the digital products: personal digital steros, cell phones, GPSs, ABS braking, electronic power-
assisted steering, etc.  
6 All the products derived from computer peripherals: CD, DVD, plasma and LCD screens, etc. 
7 Airbags, electronic injection, automated gear boxes, etc.    




This  involves  the  setting  up  or  adoption  of  new  methods  of  organization,  development, 
production, or distribution. 
 
Breakthrough innovation 
An innovation is said to be a breakthrough [Couturier et al 2002] when it completely changes 
the way in which customers use it. 
 
However,  the  management  of  organizational  change  is  an  arduous  process  (Pettigrew, 
1990), and as Segrestin [2004] observes, "companies will never be finished with the beauties 
and risks of change".
 
 
In fact, the deployment of ERP projects [Besson 1999] involves transformations not only in 
positions  and  qualifications,  but  also  in  organizational  processes.  Examples:  industrial 
manufacturing by robots in place of workers, and mail-order selling going from the 
mail to the Minitel and then to the internet. 
1.2 All the big firms have gone through the same technologic cycles. 
The rapid pace and sudden advances of technologic change have finally produced a 
convergence of behavior among many companies. Although individual choices may have 
been different, technologic breakthroughs are unifying by nature. 
 
Chronologically: 
  1960-1970: the infancy of computerized management 
The late 1960s and 1970s saw the first use of computers in management. Initially limited 
to processing applications requiring many calculations and printouts, such as invoicing 
and  payroll,  the  activity  gradually  expanded  its  scope  to  include  the  whole  of 
management,  the  main  objectives  being  to  incorporate  general  accounting,  cost 
accounting, and then budgeting. Data entry, traditional but automated processing, and 
printing accounted for most of the machine time
8.  
Computers were too costly to have more than one. The company's information was 
naturally centralized on this single machine, and its consolidation was organic. Although 
the computer was restricted to essential work , there eventually came a unique moment 
when the integration and  compatibility  of the data became comprehensive and easy 
because they were structural. 
 
  1970-1980:  the end of the mainframe monopoly 
The early 1970s saw the appearance of the minicomputer. This was a more affordable 
machine than the mainframe. At first it was used as a principal computer by customers 
who  did  not  possess  the  large  budgetary  resources  needed  to  own  a  mainframe. 
However,  the  minicomputer  also  gradually  began  to  find  its  place  as  an  additional 
computer in companies that already had a powerful mainframe. A minicomputer allowed 
departments  that  had  only  limited  access  to  shared  mainframes  to  have  their  own 
information system as well. The mainframe still provided integrated processing for the 
company's core information system, but a portion of the data now eluded it! 
 
                                                 
8 This was the unit of measurement for the activity at a time when the very limited and very expensive 
power of the machines was a precious commodity.  The departmental  data  processing  carried  out on  these  minicomputers  increased the 
computer coverage of the company's functions and provided a considerable added value 
to its management, but at the cost of a separation. The remaining data were now outside 
the main information system, and were therefore poorly consolidated or even left out of it. 
However, the gain was immense, even if it was inevitably accompanied by structural 
flaws that would eventually lead to serious problems. 
 
As technology continued to advance, the microcomputer
9 and the workstation
10 made 
their appearance.  
 
The microcomputer was built around a mono-circuit processor and was relatively cheap. 
It was a very economical computer, but its capacity was very limited.  
 
Microcomputers and workstations are not shared. They are available only to their sole 
user. These personal machines
11 would exacerbate the fragmentation and dispersal of 
data, because the compute rs did not communicate with each other. The company 
systems  were  not  designed  for  such  scattered  computing.  There  were  remote 
connections via very limited modems with a typical speed of about fifty characters per 
second
12. These were followed by Ethernet sy stems of 1 MB and then 10 MB capacity, 
but the lack of software support (OS
13 and applications), and the  cost of cabling and 
network cards
14, were powerful brakes on their development. 
 
Three approaches were now competing for the corporate data-processing business. This 
segmentation of computing was a serious problem for e-commerce. The groups of people 
who  used  mainframes,  minicomputers,  and  individual  computer  workstations  had 
different methods, techniques, strategies, and cultures. Each group wanted to develop its 
own model of computing. The other approaches were perceived as the competition, even 
the enemy, and the cooperation that is essential if synergies are to be obtained was not 
sought by any of the groups, which would lead to hidden costs when implementing ERPs. 
 
  1990-2000 Implosion and explosion 
During the 1990s, one of the firm‟s objectives was to regain control of all of its data. 
The  mainframes  would  first  attempt  to  limit  the  drain  of  applications  to  mini-  and 
microcomputers by encouraging user requests via the concept of an information center
15 
and its various manifestations. 
This approach quickly reached its limits. The central systems were unable to respond 
effectively to the needs of all of the constituencies in an integrated company. The 
proliferation of computers was inevitable. The answer to this dispersal was technical in 
nature. 
The proliferation of software  packages
16  would enable each entity to choose its own 
software in isolation, on the basis of their effectiveness in meeting their own f unctional 
needs. But this would create enormous heterogeneity both among the components of 
each group, and within each entity. 
                                                 
9 The first microcomputer that was more than just a gadget was the 1975 Commodore PET. From the 
manager's standpoint, the machine that really opened the way forward was the 1980 IBM PC. 
10 The first workstation was the Sun-1, in 1980. 
11 This new concept of computing would be confirmed by the name of IBM's first microcomputer, the 
Personal Computer (PC).  
12 600 baud. 
13 The first Microsoft operating system to have a network stack was Windows 95. 
14 Until the early 1990s, PC network cards were limited to Novell products, which were expensive and 
distributed only through integrators, often with lengthy delivery periods. 
15 This concept had originally been developed in the mid-1980s. 
16 A complete, documented set of programs designed to be distributed to a number of users, for the 
same application or function (source: http://www.futura-sciences.com/fr/comprendre/glossaire).  
In the late 1990s, the emergence of an inexpensive, worldwide network (the internet), 
and  the  replacement  of  minicomputers  and  workstations  by  powerful,  economical 
microcomputers would cause corporate computing to implode. 
The term implosion is a good description of the unique data-processing structure, which 
had broken into pieces, scattered throughout the whole entity. 
The corporate information system thus became a mosaic of equipment and applications, 
with connections that were local and partial. Stripped-down applications were developed 
for  user  stations,  using  the  three  standard  office  packages:  spreadsheets,  file-
management,  and  word-processing.  Simple  one-off  processing
17, which nevertheless 
came under the central data-processing department, was performed locally on a simple 
personal office station. This was a logical response on the local level  - for users who 
possessed simple  bureaucratic tools of ade quate power  -  to the inability of ISDs to 
provide functionalities as quickly or as effectively as they required. Such processing was 
carried out with a great deal of confusion, ignoring the rules of the data -processing 
departments, and made any consolidation or reporting impossible. 
Because business software did not lend itself to automation
18 of its operations, numerous 
human interventions were required to perform each processing, which led to errors or 
modifications
19.  
In the case in question the SOPELI Group, one of the small subsidiaries (250 persons), 
had outsourced its payroll operations to a provider without discussing the matter with the 
HRD or the Group's ISD. The provider would be  replaced on January 1, 2008  by the 
Group's own provider, which used Hypervision. This migration, which could easily have 
been avoided, obviously had a direct cost: €100 K (€400 per employee), to which must 
be added the hidden costs of changing the process. 
 
Another  trend  is  the  outsourcing,  by one component  of  the  entity,  of  a  portion of  its 
processing that the central computing department cannot handle. In contrast to facilities 
management conducted by the computer department, which does not raise issues of 
compatibility in processing and data, these uncontrolled outsourcings are carried out by 
personnel who do not belong to the central computing section. They often have neither 
the technical skills nor the knowledge of the data-processing regulations applied in the 
entity to handle this type of operation. 
“The transfer of the skills and knowledge necessary for using ERP is a critical act.  A 
number of studies have shown the decisive role played by the training of end users in the 
success of SI projects [Davis, Bostrom, 1993; Olfman, Pitsatorn 2000]"
20. 
 
  A search for compatibility in the early 2000s 
Together  with  the need to  market  their  services,  the  company's  objectives  then became 
compatibility and the free circulation of data at the group level
21. The goal was to enable the 
                                                 
17 Invoices and pay slips produced on spreadsheets, and CRMs using Word backed by Access are 
examples that I have encountered several times in the management departments of small units that 
have given up on going to their ISD because of the delays, or the failure of ISD to meet their need for 
services. 
18  Creating  macros  in  Visual  Basic,  or  programming  applications  using  Microsoft  Framework,  did 
however  enable  the  automation  of  applications  that  used  Microsoft  Office.  The  technical  level 
demanded for this type of work is that of a computer analyst, and therefore beyond the reach of basic 
users. 
19 In the late 1990s exports of files containing descriptions of thousands of students, sent by a service 
provider to one component of a large higher-education institution, were created with office software 
programs. They were imported by a program with a fixed format of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) 
type; the reject rate was 25 %. 
20 R. El Amrani, op. cit. 
21 This need for integration can be demonstrated in hindsight. All of the 383 major French companies 
that have more than 2,000 employees use at least one ERP (source: IDC, quoted by Silicon.fr). deciders to recover visibility and control over all of the components of major companies, 
whose  size  was  continuing  to  grow  because  of  the  concentration  demanded  by 
globalization
22. The Year-2000 computer bug
23 was a powerful force in making people aware 
of the dangers of dispersed computing services. 
The arena is a vast one. There is a need for a unified structure that will integrate all the 
software components that have proliferated over the last decade. The  management  of 
production, purchasing, sales, personnel, customers, and suppliers has been added to 
traditional applications like invoicing, payroll, and accounting. The other components that 
make up a data -processing system are also in need of  compatibitlty. Operating systems, 
networks, databases [Akoka, Comyn-Wattiau, 2003] and intelligent interfaces must  also be 
integrated. 
 
  An approach to integration without a data overhaul: SOPELI's business-
management tool 
SOPELI is the parent company of a group that specializes in the provision of services inside 
the  radioactive  containments  of  nuclear  power  stations.  The  group's  expertise  includes 
worksite assistance, servicing, maintenance, training, the measurement of radiation levels, 
decontamination,  and  the  processing  of  radioactive  wastes.  The  group  comprises  six 
subsidiaries, five of which are 100%-owned, and one 75%-owned but eventually expected to 
be fully owned also. The group is itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Baxtor Group, in 
which it constitutes the Maintenance Business Unit. The group as a whole employs 2,700
24 
persons, including 1,200 for SOPELI. 
The SOPELI Group is one of the major players in the sector, because of its mastery of all the 
technologies in the field, including the most advanced decontamination techniques such as 
high-velocity spraying of dry-ice granules and the use of chemical gels and foams. 
 
At  the  end  of  2005,  the  group  was  experiencing  problems  due  to  a  fragmentation  of 
management  data.  Each  company  had  its  own  computing  department,  which  was 
inconsistent with the group's own very high level of integration. The gateways between the 
companies'  computing  services  were  limited,  and  it  was  impossible  to  obtain  a  true, 
consolidated picture of the group's management data. The profits of the individual companies 
did not reflect the reality because there was a strong synergy between the group's various 
activities. A company might appear unprofitable whereas that company's activity provided the 
support  for  another  component  of  the  group,  which  derived  great  benefit  from  being 
subsidized.  Positioning with respect to competition from global  tenders was also difficult, 
because of this lack of a consolidated picture of the costs within the group. 
 
SOPELI had two main objectives in using a horizontal application: 
  To  have  direct  reporting  for  the  whole  group,  i.e.,  without  time  lags  and  without  the 
skewing produced by asynchronous data transfers coming from mixed applications. 
  To settle the tricky problem of the components of the wages of employees who work in 
radioactive environments. 
 
SOPELI did not want to launch an immediate integration of the group's data, which would 
however have been the logical solution
25. Overhauling the computing services of all seven 
                                                 
22 “In terms of sales, the concentration of service companies increased between 1993 and 2003. Over 
the same period, groups increased their dominance of this sector. Thus between 1994 and 2002, the 
share of sales made by groups went from 41 % to 64 % " (source: INSEE). 
23 and the move to the euro for EU countries. 
24 2007 workforce. 
25 “Almost all big firms now have at least one if not more ERPs. As for SMEs, more than half of them 
already have an ERP. These figures only confirm their central role in the use of SI by companies.” El 
Amrani, op. cit. 
 companies was a very onerous undertaking, and SOPELI naturally wanted to find a simpler 
alternative. The publisher of Abyss convinced SOPELI's management to choose its "Din" 
management software package for service companies, a multi-company, multi-component 
integrated  product.  The  generic  term  for  this  type  of  software  product  is  PRM  (Project 
Resource Management). 
 
Functionally, the "Din" software package represents the integration of four main modules: 
  A planning-management module of Microsoft Project type (dates, durations, etc.) 
  Management of variable costs by project (purchases, salaries, expenses ) 
  Management of invoicing 
  A financial-analysis and reporting tool in the form of performance charts  
 
Secondary functions are also included in the package: 
  Functions: Contract management, estimate management, skills management, etc. 
  Additional functions 
 
An essential component: "Din” enables data to be exported. It employs an XML format. 
 
Abyss had removed all of its outstanding reservations, claiming that its "Din" software 
product: 
  could adapt to the business rules of each of the group's entities 
  would provide full service for major projects while remaining easy to apply to smaller 
projects. 
  could  interface,  via  a  company  reference  system,  with  the other  applications  that 
made up the existing information system: 
-  Payroll 
-  Accounts 
-  Purchasing management 
-  Skills management  
  Could  interface  with  the  SAP  ERP  if  the  company  had  to  migrate,  as  its  parent 
company Baxtor had already done. 
 
The ability to interface the software with SAP was a constraint, but SOPELI hoped to put 
off a migration to this ERP as long as possible. SOPELI was also counting heavily on the 
"Din" software package to ward off the need for an early move to another integrated-
management program, whether ERP or other. 
 
After two years of efforts, only three of the six companies were using this tool. In fact, it 
was really two of the six subsidiaries, since the parent company, SOPELI, did not 
introduce any skewing or time lags in the initial versions, based entirely on transfers, 
since it was itself the reference. 
 
A disappointing performance: This very partial integration was a failure. This setback for 
the management of SOPELI's information systems was analyzed, and two major causes 
were identified: 
  Support for the change was not handled properly. There were three reasons for this: 
-  Since extending the application to all of the group's businesses was complicated, 
the ISD itself did not have a clear picture of how the procedures should develop.  
-  The  applications  previously  handled  by  SOPELI's  information-systems 
management were intended for SOPELI alone. By their very nature they fitted 
perfectly into the company's computing architecture and processes. The change 
was very limited and  SOPELI‟s information-system management had therefore 
not developed a support culture for change, and had neither the methodology nor 
the expertise required. -   The relationships between SOPELI's information-system management and the 
company's other components were simple and direct, which allowed problems to 
be solved before they became a liability. Relationships with users belonging to 
other companies in the group, even if they were wholly-owned subsidiaries, were 
complex, and had to be built up and formalized. SOPELI's information-system 
management had not succeeded in managing the distance, the cultures, and the 
independence of the users in other members of the group. 
 
  The creation of interfaces and making the necessary adjustments to the application 
so that the data would be compatible with all of its software programs were not simple 
tasks, and led to difficulties, delays, and malfunctions that produced opposition and 
roadblocks. 
 
Since the SOPELI Group was to migrate to an ERP-type management using SAP 
R/3, an assessment was made of this attempt at integration by application. None of 
the  four  objectives  that  had  been  set  for  this  application  received  a  satisfactory 
assessment, although some improvements were obtained, such as: 
-  Having  direct  reporting  for  the  whole  group.  With  only  two  of  the  five 
subsidiaries  using  the  software,  direct  reporting  has  not  yet  been  achieved. 
Manual transfers are still necessary, and there is therefore no advanced function 
such  as reporting  on  demand.  The  easing  of  manual  transfer  tasks  and  the 
reduction  in  skewing  are  limited,  and  do  not  make  up  for  the  complications 
introduced by adding this new software to the packages already in place. The time 
lag remains, because transfers from the subsidiaries were made in parallel. 
 
-  Benefits from  synergy  in data collection  This is the new  application‟s  main 
contribution. The transmission, allocation, and application of data from the badge 
readers in Sensitive Units are now fully under control. This function has been 
checked and operates autonomously. It will therefore continue to be available, 
whatever subsequent computing choices are made. 
-  etc. 
 
If we examine the components of this assessment, we can identify one very positive point 
and four negative or disappointing aspects. 
 
Positive: the analysis and management portion of the overall data define a consistent corpus, 
even if it provides few benefits for horizontal applications.  
 
Negative: 
–  The development of a horizontal application within a structure is not a simple matter, 
owing to the multiplicity of exchange interfaces required. Such development is costly, 
because each of these interfaces has to be developed individually. 
–  Managing  the  application's  deployment  in  each  of  the  entity's  components  requires 
expertise that information-system managements do not generally possess.  
–  The joint effect of the two preceding obstacles is that deployment in the daughter entities 
is not well done, which produces resistance and roadblocks. 
–  The  progress  towards  integration  is  limited,  and  does  not  always  make  up  for  the 
complexity added by the combination software. 
Thus "Organizational reconstructions both  cause and support change, but do not always 
produce  the effects  expected.  For example,  certain  companies have had the  unpleasant 
surprise of finding that the data entered were of poor quality (Saint-Léger, 2004), that the 
ERP's  functionalities  were  under-used  [Brehmet  al.,  2001],  that  the  productivity  of  their 
employees  had  fallen  (Markus  et  al.,  2000),  and/or  that  the  process  logic  had  been misapplied (Beretta, 2002). An example of a failure that became world famous involves Fox 
Meyer, even though it is a company based in a technologically-advanced country: the United 
States. The common thread in all these companies is an underestimation of the changes 
caused  by  ERP  projects,  which  has  the  effect  of  reducing  the  resources  allocated  for 
handling the change (Rosev et al., 2002)."
26 
2. Integration of SOPELI's existing system into SAP 
2.1 Integration of the “Din" software package into SAP 
Scenarios for the migration of “Din" into ERP. 
2.1.1 The first unacceptable scenario: denial of the failure and priority of "Din" over 
ERP 
This consists of preserving all the "Din" functionalities. SAP must therefore deactivate all of 
its functions that are covered by the applications in the Abyss software package.  
This was SOPELI's original preference, supported by its information-systems management. It 
is a somewhat extreme choice, but its adoption is not surprising. There are three sets of 
reasons for this: 
  Integration  into  the  SAP  ERP  was  a  decision  made  by  BEXTOR,  SOPELI's  parent 
company. This group uses SAP itself and will provide the SOPELI Group with facilities 
management  for  the  software  package.  These  two  items  have  very  disagreeable 
consequences for SOPELI's management and its ISD: 
–  The group will have to migrate to SAP, as ordered, which represents a weakening of 
the authority of SOPELI's management; 
–   BEXTOR, its parent company, will if it so desires have total control over its data-
processing and its data. BEXTOR will be free to carry out any audits and reporting 
that it may wish to perform. 
 
  The SOPELI Group has directly invested €2 M in developing the "Din" solution, to which 
must be added indirect costs such as the time spent by management-services personnel 
on the deployment, which has never been assessed. Acceptance of the SAP solution in 
its entirety adds two other items that are very unpleasant for the management of SOPELI 
and its ISD: 
–  the failure of "Din" shows that they made a mistake in choosing it; 
–  the deployment of "Din" will have been pointless, and they will thus have cost the 
SOPELI  Group  a  considerable  sum  of  money.  This  loss  will  be  passed  on  to 
BEXTOR since SOPELI is its wholly-owned subsidiary. 
–  SOPELI's management and ISD are greatly influenced by the service provider who 
developed the interoperability of their systems with "Din".  
After two years, the failure to deploy it throughout the group is now described as follows: 
“After having been deployed in the principal entity, SOPELI, the tool is now being extended 
to all the other entities in the Business Unit".  
This costly development is reduced to: "It was necessary to supplement "Din" with certain 
functional developments, which address various specific points". 
 
In this scenario, database exchanges between "Din" and SAP are shown as follows: 
 
Diagram of data-exchange flows 
                                                 
26 R. El Amrani, op. cit.  
 
It is necessary to develop interfaces between "Din" and SAP. 
 
There is no integration of data between the operational management handled by "Din" and 
the accounting maintained by SAP. This means the simultaneous loss of all that wealth of 
information, context, and history.  The „drill down‟ and „drill up‟ functions, previously obtained 
by double clicking, are no longer available. 
Transversality is thereby lost: applications remain as isolated as before, and have no real 
compatibility. There are thus no substantial benefits in switching to SAP. 
 
Here is an example of a lost ERP functionality: the management rules installed in the ERP 
are valid for all of the processes involved. If we want to propagate a management rule such 
as the setting of thresholds for validation processes in "Din", we also have to parameterize 
this software package.  
There  is  no  single  database,  and  therefore  the  corresponding  synergies  are  lost.  For 
example, it is not possible to access an overall history of the negotiations with a supplier. 
 
If this solution were adopted, SAP would be reduced to simple accounting and it would still 
be "Din" that would attempt to produce a partial integration in the form of a superset. 
This option was rejected for several reasons, each of them sufficient in itself: 
  To use SAP as a simple accounting tool makes no economic sense owing to its price 
and the cost of deploying and operating it. 
  BEXTOR, which fully grasps the ERP concept, would never have accepted a solution 
that would neutralize SAP. 
  The personnel responsible for deploying the ERP would refuse to adopt an incompatible 
architecture that could only lead to problems and failure. 
2.1.2 Other scenarios: the acceptable and the accepted 
In this second scenario, "Din" manages only projects and timekeeping. The second scenario 
is a compromise suggested by SOPELI's management and  ISD. Purchasing moves from 
"Din” to SAP. The database exchanges between "Din" and SAP may be seen as follows. 
 
The distribution of processing still requires that data be exchanged after processing. 
 
The number of imports and exports is smaller. This is an acceptable compromise but it opens 
the way to the next level. There now remains only project management, which SAP can 
handle at  least  as  well  as  "Din".  The  only  justification for  leaving  it  in  "Din"  is  to  avoid 
changing the software package, which is unacceptable when a company is switching to the 
ERP  method.  On  the  other  hand  there  are  sound  reasons  for  not  leaving  the  project 
management in "Din". Management control is performed in two different software packages: 
in the project portion of "Din" and in the management accounting of SAP. The transfer of 
other charges into "Din” causes the loss of a large part of the added value of these data, 
which are complete only in SAP The number of interfaces remains large. 2.2 The integration of SOPELI purchasing into SAP 
2.2.1 The purchasing workflow in the SAP ERP 
In SAP, roles form the logical framework
27 for human activities in a workflow
28. A role is a 
group of one or more persons associated with a function of the company, of laws, or of tasks 
to be performed. 
 
In the purchasing process, SAP defines five basic roles that follow one another: 
1.  the line officer who wishes to make a purchase; 
2.  the personnel of the Purchasing Department, who manage this request; 
3.  the technical personnel, who receive the corresponding delivery, typically the storekeeper 
in the case of a physical delivery (as opposed to a provision of services); 
4.  The financial manager who authorizes the expense; 
5.  The  "Supplier"  accounting  department,  which  checks,  records,  and  pays  the 
corresponding invoice; 
 
These basic roles may be: 
  Eliminated.  Example:  The  financial-manager's  role  may  be  eliminated,  with  the 
Purchasing Department authorizing the expense in an informal manner or by using an 
additional non-computer procedure. The elimination of a role is an impoverishment of the 
functional resources of the ERP. 
  Replaced by automated processing alone. This is typically achieved via the possibilities 
in the ERP for defining rules for amounts and frequencies, and for having a horizontal 
view of the data. For example, purchases  that do not lead to an exceedance of the 
amount fixed in the budget accounting for the category of expense of that management 
unit are automatically authorized. 
  Simplified.  Example:  Financial  approval  for  small  purchases  that  do  not  exceed  an 
amount fixed in advance may be eliminated 
  Made more complex   Example: Financial approvals may be made more numerous for 
major purchases above a fixed amount. 
 
If we follow good ERP practice, a purchase's workflow comprises seven stages: 
1.  The  Purchasing  Department  compiles  supplier  catalogs  and  lists  of  proposals  that 
provide a framework for future orders. 
  The supplier catalogs offer selections of items that can be consulted by line personnel 
who want to place an order. For any category of items, off-catalog purchases can be 
prohibited. 
  The lists of requests for proposals are selections of suppliers who must be made to 
compete for a particular type of purchase. 
 
2.  A line officer expresses a need The choice of the product  reference and the supplier 
depends on the kind of product: 
  Standard product: purchase from the catalog created by the Purchasing Department, 
based on a search for the best compromise between price, deliveries, and qualities, 
from a limited list of suppliers. 
  The  product  is  highly  technical:  its  selection  requires  skills  that  the  Purchasing 
Department does not possess. The line officer selects one or more references from 
                                                 
27  In  the  computing  sense,  it  means  the  manner  in  which  an  automated  system  apprehends  its 
environment. It contrasts with the physical view, which refers to the technical manner of processing 
the environment. The tables in a database are a logical image of information, as opposed to files on 
magnetic disks, which are its physical reality. 
28  Successive  flows  of  actions  or  processings  formally  performed  by  persons,  and  automated 
processings enabling a result to be obtained (after webopedia.com). one or more suppliers. The Purchasing Department negotiates with the supplier only 
on the terms. 
  The product is half way between these two extremes. The line officer typically makes 
a proposal for references from the relevant set of products and suppliers, in the form 
of a free choice or a request for proposals. 
 
3.  The line officer's request triggers three actions in the Purchasing Department: 
  Product and supplier references. If the choice is: 
  imposed or restricted, the Department confirms that these references comply with 
the established rules; 
    -   open or semi-open, the Department performs a check on the best possible cost and 
delivery; 
  Possible grouping of requests to reduce the buying expenses; 
  Establishing the order. 
 
4.  Financial validation of the order 
Depending on the rules for delegation, and on the nature and amount of the order, one or 
more  signatures  are  required.  If  the  signatures  are  not  electronic,  the  Purchasing 
Department is responsible for collecting and entering them. 
 
5.  Upon delivery, there is an acceptance in the legal sense for products and sometimes for 
services. Typically, the storekeeper is responsible for this task if the product is in fact a 
good, and more probably a line officer, typically the author of the request, if it concerns 
the provision of a service. 
 
6.  On receiving the invoice, the supplier accounting department performs two checks: 
-  delivered quantity = invoiced quantity 
-  unit price on the invoice  UP on the order 
Partial  or  over  deliveries  (quantity  delivered  >  quantity  ordered)  are  handled  by  the 
software. 
 
7.  On the due date of the invoice, the supplier accounts department sends a payment order 
to the bank. 
 
The  benefits  of  moving  from  free-standing  purchasing  software  to  the  processing  of 
purchases by an ERP are many: 
  There is no transfer of data between programs. All of the data related to one order are 
stored in a single database. The product reference, the supplier references, the quantity, 
the financial terms, the authorizations obtained, the delivery date(s), the description of 
actual delivery, the details of the invoice and its payment - everything is preserved and 
accessible, together with the history and context. This integration combined with the 
ERP's power offers possibilities with high added values: 
  In SAP, the drill
29 up and drill down functions enable any data (supplier, item, etc.) or set 
of data (order, delivery, accounting record, etc.) to be used to mo ve up or down in the 
data or connected sets of data with just a double click. 
  It is not only possible to follow the data throughout the workflow, but also to change 
branches  in  the data  tree.  An  item's  reference can  be  used  to find  the other  items 
recommended  by  a  supplier.  The  point  of  view  can  also  be  changed,  as  in  a 
hypercube
30, and one can look for the price variations over time of a given product, for 
one or more suppliers. It is also possible to use invoices to compare suppliers. 
                                                 
29 Drill: by analogy to data mining, comparing the extraction of data from an information system to the 
extraction of valuable ores from a mine. 
30 A hypercube is an abstract representation of multidimensional information, which enables data to be 
seen from different points of view: geographic, temporal, organizational, etc.   Roles address the company's base of persons, which is stored in a unique space. A 
change in a person's profile is immediately reflected in all of his or her roles. This offers 
great flexibility and great security. 
2.2.2 Purchasing functions in companies of the SOPELI Group 
Three cases summarize the migration of the SOPELI Group's Purchasing function into SAP: 
two that were easy to transfer, and one that failed. 
 
  The first case was one of the smaller companies in the SOPELI Group, which had no 
way to manage the expression of its needs. Line personnel completed a paper purchase 
order  form  and  sent  it  to  the  purchasing  department.  In  the  absence  of  any  formal 
framework,  the  department  manager  could  change  items  (supplier,  quantity,  product 
reference) or reject the orders, usually after personally contacting the requesting party. 
In the event of a dispute, it was the management that decided. For this company the 
choice was a simple one. The decision was to adopt the new Purchasing process. 
 
  The second case was a larger subsidiary that had installed a Workflow very similar to 
that  recommended  by  good  SAP  practice,  although  less  integrated  on  the  data-
processing  level.  However,  it  included  a  significant  variant.  Because  of  the  highly 
technical nature of decontamination in the nuclear industry, orders could be submitted by 
the line officer or by a prescriber. If the order came directly from the line officer, the 
prescriber had to approve it. The conversion to SAP was simple. The purchase order 
was changed into an expression of needs and an additional role was created to preserve 
the prescriber's prerogatives. This role was considered to be worthwhile and a source of 
added value. It was put into general use in all the companies of the SOPELIS Group. 
 
  The third case was "Din". As already noted, the software package and its rules were 
purely and simply deactivated, retaining only a support for the timekeeping function. 
 
  The final workflow diagram for purchasing is shown below. It perfectly matches the SAP 
requirements and incorporates the specific features of the SOPELIS Group.  
Conclusion 
The  forced  development  of  management  computing  between  1960  and  2000  typically 
produced fragmented information systems which used an assortment of software packages, 
dispersed in various parts of the entity.  
The use of interfaces to perform periodic exchanges of data has demonstrated its limits, and 
entities have turned to partial integrations based on the use of horizontal software.  
Now that this initial search for  compatibility has produced disappointing results, the ERP 
solution is seen as the only complete and satisfactory one. 
 
There are two ways to make the move to ERP successfully. 
  The  first  is  limited  to  firms  that  already  have  the  good  management  practices 
recognized by installed ERPs. The transfer of existing procedures into the ERP is 
simple, and the firm can retain its operating methods while also benefiting from the 
advantages of ERP's data integration. 
  The second applies to firms that have made poor choices and find themselves with 
incomplete  systems  that  enable  a  partial  integration,  i.e.,  an  introduction.  These 
architectures often improved matters at one time, but have since shown their limits 
and shortcomings. The sooner and the more completely the firm abandons its use of 
them, the fewer problems it will face when it migrates to an ERP. Although the above 
solution may be costly and difficult to implement, such firms must set aside their 
former software and move on, without regrets, to a comprehensive solution. 
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